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Abstract 
 
The anonymisation of personal data has multiple purposes within research: as a marker of ethical 
practice, a means of reducing regulation and as a safeguard for protecting respondent privacy. 
However, the growing capabilities of technology to gather and analyse data have raised concerns 
over the potential reidentification of anonymised data-sets. This has sparked a wide ranging debate 
amongst both academic researchers and policy makers as to whether anonymisation can continue to 
be relied upon. This debate has the potential to create important implications for market research. 
This paper analyses the key arguments both for and against anonymisation as an effective tool given 
the changing technological environment. We consider the future position of anonymisation and 
question whether anonymisation can remain its key role given the potential impact on both 
respondent trust and the nature of self-regulation within market research.   
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Introduction  
 
“A survey of UK and US citizens suggests that 41% do not trust market research companies 
with their data…People appear to be more trusting of search engines, mobile phone 
companies and even national security agencies.” - Tarran, 2014 
 
Trust has long been recognized as a key factor in facilitating the forms of relationships upon which 
market research relies (Moorman et al. 1993). It plays a key role in reducing the perception of risks 
in research (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) whilst having a positive impact on respondent engagement in 
research (Moorman et al. 1992).  Any factors that have the potential to impact the trust that the 
public has in the research process are therefore significant. In a theoretical sense trust can be 
understood as a mechanism that serves to mitigate the risk of opportunism towards respondents in 
an exchange characterized by uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Within the context of the 
growing important of secondary online data the role of respondent trust has been recognized as 
playing an increasingly important role in the level of and quality of responses. A lack of trust has 
been associated with lower response rates, fabrication of personal information as well as other 
forms of obfuscation taken as acts to protect personal privacy (Lwin and Williams, 2003; Wirtz et 
al., 2007). 
  
A key mechanism through which respondent data is protected, and trust maintained is by the 
effective anonymisation of personal data. In this context anonymisation is the process through 
which personal data is removed from datasets before they are shared more broadly, whether within 
organisations or externally. Despite its central role in discussions around the contemporary use of 
big data anonymisation has received relatively little coverage within the literature relating to market 
research. This may relate to more limited levels of systematic data sharing, use of open data or other 
forms of ‘release and forget’ data within commercial market research. This can be contrasted with 
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other research contexts, for example within health and social sector where sharing and use of open 
data is more widespread. However, due to the growing scope and availability of such datasets their 
use within commercial settings is already recognized as being of strategic importance, as 
highlighted by the examples given later in this paper. Although there has been broad coverage 
amongst scholars in legal and technology domains there remains a gap relating to the issues 
surrounding anonymisation in a social or market research context.  This paper seeks to address this 
gap by recognising data anonymisation as not simply an issue of law or technology, but one that 
goes to the heart of the challenges around the wider social issue of trust in research.  
 
By evaluating and reconciling the differing views relating to anonymisation, particularly in the light 
of changing patterns of data collection, we seek to build a greater understanding of the key role that 
anonymisation is likely to play going forward. This paper is structured as follows. We begin by 
exploring the concept of anonymisation and its role within contemporary research practice. Using 
examples, we discuss the often high profile debates amongst research relating to the risks in 
reidentifying anonymised data. A synthesis of this debate is presented from which we highlight the 
challenges and risks with maintaining the ‘promise’ of anonymity.  
 
The Role and Importance of Anonymisation  
Anonymisation is rooted in the defining principle of research ethics: that participants in research 
should not be harmed as a result of participation. Data collected during a research process could, if 
gathered in the wrong hands, cause harm to respondents by making public information that was not 
designed to be. Harm can be caused both directly and indirectly. In the direct case, the 
reidentification of personal identifiers such as name or address could lead to linking back personal 
details, such as financial or health information. In the indirect case reidentification can happen 
through the combination of multiple datasets even without any active or malicious attempt to de 
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reidentify the data. Examples of these scenarios are given later in this paper. Given the link between 
trust in the person or organisation carrying out research and response rates (Edwards, 2002) there is 
an impetus to ensure individuals know that their personal data could not, even theoretically, cause 
them harm. Whilst this sets the scene for anonymisation its importance within ethical and self-
regulatory frameworks has emerged through legal drivers. The identification of the concept of 
personal data by the Council of Europe in 1981 created with it a regulatory necessary for 
researchers to understand whether what they could be dealing with was personal data and, by 
extension, an incentive to develop ways to avoid dealing with personal information to reduce the 
regulatory burden. Anonymity can be therefore characterised as playing a useful role in aligning the 
interests of researchers with participants.  
 
From a UK perspective the Data Protection Act provided further specificity on where researchers 
could look to draw the line between personal and non-personal data. Crucially it applies not simply 
to reidentification from a single data set but other forms or combinations of data. 
 
Figure 1. Goes about here 
 
The importance of building understanding of anonymisation is three-fold. Firstly, working with 
anonymised data has been adopted by the research profession as a defining characteristic of the 
field. Ensuring that any data collected is correctly anonymised is a core feature of market research. 
For example, it features prominently in the both the MRS and ESOMAR codes (figure 2.).  
 
Figure 2. goes about here 
 
Secondly, anonymisation has also become, in legal and regulatory terms, a boundary between what 
might be considered as personal data and thus subject to data protection legislation. The 
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attractiveness of anonymisation has been partly been driven by a view that anonymised data is ‘of 
no interest to regulators’ (Aldhouse, 2014:405). Thus, in an environment where personal data is 
coming increasingly under regulatory scrutiny anonymisation provides a route through which to 
more easily protect the existence of self-regulation.   
 
Thirdly, due to rising concern over the potential for reidentification, with scare stories appearing in 
the media on a near daily basis (Aldhouse, 2014), if the techniques that underly the principles of 
anonymisation are shown to be broken there are serious implications for those who rely upon it to 
maintain trust. The concept that anonymisation might be broken has become the subject of 
increasingly wide debate in academic circles with two alternative, and competing, views. On the 
one hand legal scholars argue for the importance of anonymisation to maintain the key legal 
underpinnings of research. Without anonymisation, it is argued, the utility of market research will 
be severely harmed. On the other hand are information systems and computer science academics 
who argue that the anonymisation as a concept cannot be guaranteed in a way that can be aligned 
with the patterns of data use that are seen within the contemporary ‘big’ data strategies (Nunan & 
Di Domenico, 2013). Whilst the importance of anonymisation is well embedded within research 
practice, the arguments against anonymisation should not be dismissed as a niche academic 
concern. For example, in the US the Presidents Council on Science and Technology has stated the 
following: 
 
“it is increasingly easy to defeat anonymization by the very techniques that are being 
developed for many legitimate applications of big data…PCAST does not  see it as being a 
useful basis for policy.” (PCAST, 2014). 
 
The latter part of this statement is important given that anonymisation features heavily de facto in 
both policy and legislation.  
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The re-identification problem 
Challenges to reidentification have emerged through the growing number of scenarios where 
supposedly anonymous data sets have been subject to reidentification. From the reidentification of 
the health details of Massachusetts Governor William Weld in 1997 following his 1996 collapse at 
a public event, hospitalisation and almost immediate recovery (Ohm, 2009) to more recent 
reidentifications these events, and the media coverage surrounding them, have tracked the growth in 
the internet. Whilst an old example, in internet terms at least, the story of Governor Weld highlights 
both the risks of reidentification, but also the danger in exaggeration from media hype. It was a 
graduate student named Latanya Sweeney, now a Professor at Harvard, who carried out the 
analysis1. The Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission had made available a set of, 
supposedly, anonymised data for researchers that contained information on treatment date, ZIP code 
and gender. At the same time Sweeney was able to purchase, for $20, an full set of electoral roll 
data containing ZIP code, birth date, and gender.  Based upon these variables it is not difficult to see 
how the datasets could be easily combined, and from this a single match was identified and 
Sweeney able to send the correct set of re-identified health records to the Governor (Ohm, 2009). 
This example has since been used as a parable for the risks relating to data re-identification in the 
internet era - if the Governor of Massachusetts can have his health data reidentified so easily,  
couldn't anyone. However, there are a number of flaws in this argument, not least that the range of 
variables made available means that the data was not properly deidentified. The provision of ZIP 
code and gender narrows the field of potential individuals to such a great extent that the addition of 
even a small number of additional variables enables reidentification. In any case, the subsequent 
tightening of HIPAA privacy regulations in 2003 would have made the approaches used ineffective 
(Barth-Jones, 2012). In addition to the way that the data was anonymised there are the 
                                                 
1Whilst an illustrative summary is provided here a full analysis has been published by Barth-Jones (2012) 
and Ohm (2009). 
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characteristics of the data subjects themselves. This example included a high-profile individual for 
whom there existed a large set of existing public data. It was therefore possible to verify with a 
highly level of certainty that the individual was the one identified from the data even where, as in 
many cases, the public dataset was incomplete.   
 
Despite the changing technological infrastructure since 1997 the issues of the effectiveness of 
anonymisation and the re-identification from a general population have much in common with a 
recent example of reidentification of NY Taxi data discussed later in this paper. 
 
Figure 3. goes about here 
 
 
A number of cases of reidentification and their causes are highlighted  in figure 3. This is, by 
necessity, a non-representative sample of incidents of reidentification as it highlights only some of 
those that have reached prominence through the media. One trend that has can be observed from the 
data is reidentification shifting from being a complex, and perhaps difficult, laboratory project 
through to something that is accessible to those with more mainstream technical skills.  
 
Concerns over the threats to anonymisation, perceived and actual, manifest themselves in two 
competing streams of debate. The first broadly argues that anonymisation must exist because 
through enabling research it provides significant value to the economy. The second argues that, 
given technological trends, the standards required for anonymisation keeps rising and we can 
therefore not guarantee that information remains anonymous. The paper now explores each of these 
perspectives in turn.   
 
Perspective 1: Anonymisation Must Work - “the Tragedy of the Data Commons” 
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We label the first perspective “anonymisation must work” to reflect the focus on wider social and 
economic benefits of anonymisation whilst playing down the extent of the technical risks. 
Effectively, this argues that critics of anonymisation are highlighting purely theoretical and 
laboratory risks that matter far less in the real world.  
 
Yakowitz (2011) frames this debate by introducing the concept of the data commons, defined as 
“the disparate and diffuse collections of data made broadly available to researchers with only 
minimal barriers to entry” (ibid:403). This recalls the analogy of the tragedy of the commons 
(Harden, 1968) used to highlight the tension between individual interests and the common good. 
The original example related to the grazing on common land, whereby individuals benefitted from 
its provision but over-exploitation of the resource harmed everyone. At the same time there was 
little incentive for an individual to reduce their own grazing. Harden did not interpret tragedy as a 
form of unhappiness but it was meant, in a philosophical sense, as a form of futility reflecting the 
“remorseless working of things” (Yakowitz, 2011:1245).  The ‘tragedy’ in a research sense relates 
to a situation where individuals feel able to opt-out or remove their personal information from data 
collected but still profit from the benefits that are brought by the use of the data.  
 
Yakowitz, and others supporting this argument, argue that the risks have been overstated and, when 
weighed against the benefits, are acceptable. This perspective does not question that anonymisation 
is foolproof, nor that the changing technology landscape leaves it unscathed. However, it suggests 
that it is a combination of media excitement and failures in the processes through which data was 
anonymised that have caused the issues. For anonymisation “the sky is not falling” (ibid:35) for 
three reasons:  
 
1. Anonymisation processes are defective. 
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In many cases it is the ineffective use of anonymisation techniques that causes problems, not 
the concept of anonymisation itself. For example, the AOL search data case (figure 3.) relied 
on pseudonymization where a single numerical key - related to an individual - was attached to 
each search term. Given the personal nature of search information, for example that variables 
such as demographics and location can often by inferred from the types of search undertaken, 
it was not surprising that a number of individuals could be identified. From searches related to 
specific pets, health issues and homes for sale user 4417749 was identified as a 62 year old 
widow from Lilburn, Georgia (Barbaro & Zeller, 2006). The scenario for the New York Taxi 
case was enabled by a similar mistake. Whilst a common cryptographic algorithm, known as 
MD5, was used to encode the cab drivers medallion number (i.e. unique ID number) it was 
only effective when one is unaware of the original format of the number. Unfortunately, one 
doesn’t need to live in New York to find out the format of a New York taxi medallion number 
as a search on Google images will quickly provide an example. The argument is therefore that 
anonymisation works if it is done properly and that the failure of anonymisation is a failure of 
the anonymisation process, not necessarily a failure of anonymisation itself. The answer is 
therefore better technical solutions to offer more effective approaches to anonymisation have 
become adopted, such as k anonymisation (Sweeney, 2002).  
 
2. The low probability that adversaries exist. 
Negative effects of reidentification assume that there is someone willing and able to exploit 
the misuse of data. As Yakowitz puts it (2011:34) “…the marginal value of the information in 
a public dataset is usually too low to justify the effort for an intruder”. The point here is that it 
requires not only the intent to cause harm, but an acceptance that if someone wants to access 
personal data, and they are willing to ignore the law, there are far simpler mechanisms to 
gaining personal data than a complex reidentification process. 
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3. The low level of risk posed by reidentification compared to tolerated risks.  
Once the effectiveness of anonymisation is characteristised as an exercise in calculating risk it 
requires an analysis of what is an acceptable level of risk. One of the widely cited examples of 
US health data being reidentified (Sweeney, 2011) found a reidentification rate of 0.04%, 
similar to the lifetime risk of being hit by lightening and considerably less risky than dying in 
an accident at home (Calman and Royson, 1997). Even as risks grow over time as the scope of 
data and power of technology increase these must be put into perspective in terms of other 
general risks within society. 
 
Bringing the discussion full circle, the metaphor of the commons related specifically to the 
unregulated commons (Harden, 1998) and it could be argued that the issues anonymisation points 
towards greater regulation to prevent reidentification activity (Barbaro & Zeller, 2006). Overall, the 
argument is that the benefits of anonymised data for research, whether it commercial, social or 
scientific are very great whilst the risks have been overstated. Given that much of society functions 
on the basis of weighing up and evaluating difference forms of risk the types of risks created from 
anonymisation are manageable. In short, what is therefore needed is a regulatory solution to enforce 
the effectiveness of anonymisation.  
 
Perspective 2: Anonymisation Can’t Work - “The Database of Ruin” 
“For almost every person on earth, there is at least one fact about them stored in a computer 
database that an adversary could use to blackmail, discriminate against, harass, or steal the 
identity of him or her.… For almost every one of us, then, we can assume a hypothetical 
“database of ruin,” the one containing this fact but until now splintered across dozens of 
databases on computers around the world, and thus disconnected from our identity.” - Ohm, 
2009: 41 
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A second perspective does not lay the problems of anonymisation with inconsistent implementation 
or management of risk, but argues changes in technology have left it ineffective in the context of 
contemporary characteristics of data generation. This argument has been highlighted by researchers 
within information systems and computer science, and taken forward by legal scholars in the 
context of the shifting debates on implications for privacy.  It is necessary to differentiate this 
argument from reflection upon the media ‘hype’ that often accompanies examples of 
reidentification, such as those given earlier in this paper. Indeed, whilst the first perspective may be 
said to have a very practical foundation the second combines this with a theoretical base.  
 
Whilst the question of challenges of reidentification have been widely debated amongst computer 
scientists it is law Professor Paul Ohm who has made the most widely cited arguments over the 
failure of anonymisation. The lessons provided by Ohm are notable for commercial researchers as 
they not only critique the failure of anonymisation from a technical perspective but consider how 
these failures might be remedied in a world where rights to privacy cannot be so easily dismissed. 
 
Ohm argues that anonymisation is both important and flawed. It is important because many of the 
legal defences of privacy depend on the effective anonymisation of data and thus, indirectly, 
anonymisation plays a key role in the ordering of society.  He argues that anonymisation worked 
well over a 15 year period in the early era of computing and the internet but, in the face of 
increasing computer power and available of datasets, it is no longer effective. The barriers to 
reidentification are lower than might be supposed with 87% of Americans being uniquely 
identifiable from a ZIP code, birth date and sex (Sweeney, 2000). The key point is not that data 
cannot be anonymised, but that doing effectively removes much of the utility that might be gained 
from analysing the data.  
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Researchers within computer science have provided a number of technical arguments that seek to 
highlight the limitations of anonymisation approaches2. Here, the promise of anonymisation is 
ineffective as we are unable to predict the direction of technologies in the future: 
 
“Due to the ad hoc de-identification methods applied to currently released  datasets, the 
chances of re-identification depend highly on the progress of re-identification tools and the 
auxiliary datasets available to an adversary. The probability of a privacy violation in the 
future is essentially unknowable.” (Narayanan et al. 2015) 
 
At the root of this issue are difficulties in defining the concept of anonymisation itself. Whilst 
personal data is often considered as being a relatively narrow set of data directly relating to a 
persons identity, geography or demography, in the context of reidentification any variable that 
might be used to distinguish one person from another could be considered as personal (Narayanan 
and Shmatikov, 2010). Technical approaches to identification, such as use of k-anonymity, assume 
that some variables are non-identifying. Such approaches might be considered as being better, in 
providing an increase in the barriers to reidentification, but they are not a solution. Narayanan et al. 
(2015) argue that due to the difficulties in identifying future technology capabilities and the 
inability to delete data once made public it is not just that the risk is unknown - it is unknowable.  
 
Ohm’s emotively titled ‘database of ruin’ represents the sum of the risks contained through the 
potential for individual data to be identified. Ohm uses the phrase ‘privacy theatre’ to describe the 
current approach to anonymisation, implying that researchers are thoughtlessly going through the 
motions of privacy in procedures that are not effective. This alludes to the concept of ‘security 
theatre’ that has been used to describe forms of security protection that give the appearance of 
security without fully addressing the underlying risk factors, for example in airports (Schneier, 
                                                 
2 see Narayanan et al. 2015 for a detailed explanation of the issues with anonymisation. 
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2009). The remedy is to abandon both the promise and language of perfect anonymisation, 
including terms such as anonymisation and deidentification, and present the process of protecting 
personal data in more nuanced terms. Both Ohm and Sweeney prefer the term ‘scrub’, although it is 
unclear whether this serves to add greater clarity. Beyond the basics of terminology there is a 
recognition that the existing regulatory regime in many countries, being so dependent on the 
concept of protecting personally identifiable information through anonymisation, will need to be 
rethought. Here the question or how to best regulate privacy, like the concept of privacy itself, 
becomes confused and divided between addressing privacy in a specific context rather than as a 
general framework. Arguably the most influential scholar in the field of privacy, Dan Solove, 
argues for regulations to be neither too general or too specific, but also that privacy issues can only 
be resolved in regulatory terms by considering both the general and the specific (Solove, 2008).  
 
As an example we return to the case of the New York taxi data being reidentified.. Whilst the media 
coverage related to this scenario focused upon identifying the tips, or lack of tips, that various 
celebrities gave to the taxi driver, other potential sources of personal information such as a home 
address could also be inferred from the data. The point is that the type of anonymisation required to 
have prevented such reidentification taking place would also have so severely restricted the value of 
the data so as to be of very limited use. It also highlights that anonymisation can only be effective in 
the light of an analysis of what other data sources and variables it can be combined with. Of wider 
interest is the implication that the range of variables from which personal data can be inferred is 
broader than had been anticipated, particularly when location can be inferred from data (Krumm, 
2007). 
 
Despite the critiques of Ohm’s argument discussed earlier he draws two, more modest, conclusions 
that from which wider agreement might be possible (Ohm, 2009:5). The first is that the changes in 
technology relating to data collection and analysis will continue to increase the risks of 
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reidentification. The second is that further regulations with the goal of strengthening requirements 
for anonymised data have the potential for significant negative impacts upon the utility of 
information available to researchers. This argument can be summarised as a longer term view - it is 
not necessarily the current risks that are important, but the direction of travel and the techniques that 
enable future reidentification using data collected today.  
 
Anonymisation and market research: where do we go from here? 
Whilst the two arguments outlined in this paper are not aligned, they are not necessarily opposed. 
Despite the very different approaches and philosophies underlying these two perspectives they both 
reach similar conclusions: a combination of regulatory and technical solutions are required to 
protect the public from the risks of reidenfication of personal data and determine levels of 
acceptable risk. Thus, even where we are clear on how technology works the wider social 
consequences only become clear over time (Coates, 1982).  If anonymisation cannot be guaranteed 
in strictly technical terms a case can be made that the risks are outweighed by the wider social or 
economic benefits. 
 
For market research the issue is less straightforward. As with the wider research sector there is a 
desire for the status quo not only in terms of anonymisation but also in terms of regulation, with 
bodies such as the Wellcome trust characterising the choice as between ‘privacy and possibility’ 
(Wellcome Trust, 2015). However, with proposed updates to EU privacy regulations drawing a 
distinction, for example, between public health research and broader commercial research there is 
also the issue of maintaining of self-regulation. These regulatory drivers are not limited to Europe 
with updating and tightening of data protection legislation on the agenda around the world, not least 
in the US. The key limit of self-regulation is that it can only apply to the actions of those 
organisations that have chosen to be part of a particular regulatory regime. As the ‘data sector’ has 
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grown to be much broader in scope that the traditionally defined market research sector so has the 
potential for externalities that cannot be controlled through self-regulation.  
 
With the growth of big data and the subsequent trend towards collection and analysis of secondary 
data such as social media or sensor data, many areas of research involve a shift from researchers 
being ‘creators’ of data to users of data created by others. To appreciate the extent of this, one only 
has to look at how many leading firms that used to define themselves as being in market research 
now describe their business as ‘data science’. In this shift to analysis a dependency is created upon 
the norms of organisations driven by a commercial imperative to work with individual level rather 
than anonymised data.  An approach that pushes for statutory legislation to protect the effectiveness 
of anonymisation therefore carries with it an implicit acceptance of the limits of self-regulation. 
 
The alternative is an acceptance that blanket anonymity is a promise that cannot be kept. The 
promise in this context is part of the overall argument that researchers can, and should, be trusted 
with data. It is this promise that is, at the least, undermined by the technical factors outlined in this 
paper. Whilst at this point in the paper it would be cleaner to provide a clear resolution and way 
forward, the reality is more messy. The changing technological landscape creates a level of 
uncertainty that makes predictions impractical. Rather than be prescriptive our goal in this paper is 
to draw attention to an important side-effect of the changing nature of research technology and data 
use. 
 
However, in a more practical sense this paper underlines the importance of the management of 
current and future potential risks related to anonymisation and of communicating them to research 
participants. These risks should not be seen as being entirely, or even wholly related to the potential 
for data reidentification. To reemphasise the point made earlier: given the large volumes of data 
being collected the risk of accidental reidentification remains comparatively low. Rather, the 
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potential risk is that participants in research perceive the concept of anonymisation to be 
misleading, or ineffective, and that this perception impacts upon the types of data that they are 
willing to share with researchers.  The collection of data carries with it risk, and researchers need to 
share these risks with the public. The question is how researchers can ensure that participants are 
better aware of the risks whilst still maintaining the principle of anonymity from a data protection 
perspective. With this in mind we offer two directions for further debate amongst the research 
community.  
 
 Firstly, if we are dealing with research participants rather than respondents (as the new MRS 
code implies) then researchers have a duty to provide individuals with the information they 
need to enable them to participate. This means that consideration must be given to being less 
equivocal over the types of guarantees offered to participants. A follow-on from this is that 
it creates a risk around respondents being less willing to partake in research. However, at the 
same time these respondents are likely to be making their decisions in a more informed way, 
and thus this would partly fulfill the need for adapting informed consent to fit contemporary 
technology.  
 
 Secondly, there is the more strategic view of the effectiveness of the concept of anonymised 
data. Researchers have to consider both the potential direction of legislation as well as the 
development of social norms with regards to privacy. How might market research cope with 
a world where anonymisation of data is legally mandated, technically difficult and treated 
with indifference by participants?  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the key debates surrounding the issues of anonymisation. Whilst this has 
specific relevance to the use of anonymisation as a key characteristic of ‘legitimate’ market 
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research, it also serves as a microcosm of the wider tensions around legislation, technology and 
participants that have the potential to pull market research in multiple directions. As the size of the 
data economy increases it also highlights the increasing influence of external actors upon the 
research world and with it the limits of self-regulation.  
 
Although in the context of the methods described in this paper it refers to the future of research, as 
much as the present, the central importance of the concept of anonymisation remains. We have 
argued that anonymisation has a unique place within market research, as opposed to other uses of 
commercial data, as it enables respondent trust and the maintenance of a self-regulatory regime. The 
ambiguity over the impact of new technologies together with a changing legal climate threatens 
this. Whilst informing respondents over the risks related to anonymisation may result in reduced 
response rates, or access to more limited datasets, researchers would do well to remember that trust 
does not come free.  
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